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Abstract
Android’s graphical password unlock remains one of the most widely used schemes for phone unlock
authentication, and it is has been studied extensively in the last decade since its launch. We have
learned that users’ choice of patterns mimics the poor password choices in other systems, such as PIN or
text-based passwords. A wide variety of analysis and data collections methods was used to reach these
conclusions, but what is missing from the literature is a systemized comparison of the related work in this
space that compares both the methodology and the results. In this paper, we take a detailed accounting
of the different methods applied to data collection and analysis for Android unlock patterns. We do so
in two dimensions. First we systemize prior work into a detailed taxonomy of collection methods, and
in the second dimension, we perform a detailed analysis of 9 different data sets collected using different
methods. While this study focuses singularly on the collection methods and comparisons of the Android
pattern unlock scheme, we believe that many of the findings generalize to other graphical password
schemes, unlock authentication technology, and other knowledge-based authentication schemes.
1 Introduction
Studies examining password systems are an important part of computer and usable security. The challenge
with password systems, generally, is that humans choose passwords as opposed to using randomly generated
or mnemonic passwords/pass-phrases [24, 31, 29, 28]. With the advent of mobile computing on smartphones
and tablets, unlock authentication choices used to locking and unlocking mobile device plays a significant
role in information security.
The two prominent platforms, Apple’s iPhone running iOS and Android OS devices, dominate the mar-
ket and both provide ingrained mechanisms for protecting the unlock procedure. While biometrics, e.g.,
fingerprint- or face-identification, are secondary/continuous authentication options, passcode/knowledge-
based authentication is still the primary means for securing a mobile device.
The most common knowledge-based passcode authentication is PINs, where the iPhone requires users
to create and enter a passcode consisting of (at-least) a 4-digit PIN (later updates may require a 6-digit
PIN). Android, from the time of its initial launch, offers a wider variety of unlock authentication techniques,
including PIN, text-based passwords, face identification, and, most relevant to this paper, the graphical
password pattern.
Since its launch, the Android unlock pattern has been widely studied in many contexts. Foremost, studies
of choice of unlock authentication type [15, 19, 40, 17, 18, 43] has shown Android patterns remains relatively
popular as an authentication choice. Patterns has also been studied with respect to side channels, such as
∗Corresponding Author
1
Figure 1: (left) Reachable contact points in 3x3 Pattern Unlock from the top left contact point, and (right)
a common pattern, the Z-shaped pattern.
smudge attacks [7], sensor attacks [9], video attacks [48], shoulder surfing [30, 42, 14, 5] or eye tracing [12].
Other studies have examined the impact of guessing attacks [37, 4].
Most relevant to this paper, there have also been a number of studies [33, 34, 20, 37, 26, 4, 3, 44]
analyzing user choice of Android graphical password patterns, variations therein [4, 37, 36, 13] (such as
adding or removing contact points), methods to affect choice [33, 34, 2] (such as password meters), and
demographic factors in selection [8, 26]. What is missing from the literature is a systemized comparison of
the related work in this space that compares both the methodology and the results.
In this paper, we perform such analysis by first performing an extensive classification and categorization
across the prior studies in a taxonomy of collection methods and analysis techniques used. Second, we
were able to obtain 9 distinct datasets from 4 prior publications [37, 4, 26, 44] and perform an extensive
comparison of both the visual features of the patterns and the relative security. From this analysis and our
classifications we make the following contributions:
• Collection methods can minimally affect spatial features, such as the length of the patterns, but for
other visual properties, e.g., crosses, start, and end, there does not appear to be correlations with
collection method.
• Collection methods can affect the comparative guessing strength. We find that there exists three
regimes, a high, medium and low strength regime; we conjecture that the medium strength regime
likely is the most realistic as it contains the highest clustering, including a data set with self reported
patterns.
• Patterns in the high and low strength regimes are related to adversarial collection methods, whereby
participants both select patterns they do not want others to guess and generate patterns to guess
others. The so-called “defensive” patterns are significantly harder to guess compared to the medium
strength regime, and the “offensive” patterns are significantly easier to guess.
• Collection whereby participants are encouraged to generate patterns that match a scenario, e.g., are
asked to generate a pattern to secure a bank account, can provide both medium and low strength
datasets, dependent on the strength of the motivator in the scenario.
• While pattern collection on devices is likely preferred, we do not see significant differences between
data sets collected using a device or pen-and-paper.
2 Related Work and Background
Mobile Authentication Unlock Choices There are three basic choices for knowledge-based unlock
authentication on mobile devices, depending on platform and model.
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• PIN based authentication, sometimes referred to as passcodes on iPhones: where a user is asked to
recall a PIN of a length at least four digits (newer iPhones, however, will require a 6-digit passcode [16]).
• Pattern based authentication: where a user is asked to recall a gesture that interconnects a set of 3x3
contact points. On the Android OS, four or more points should be selected. The user cannot jump
over points not visited before. We will focus almost exclusively on this authentication method in this
survey.
• Password based authentication, sometimes called an alpha-numeric passcode: where a user is asked to
recall a standard text-based password (entered using a soft-keyboard) to unlock the device.
On more recent mobile devices, users also have the option to select a biometric, such as a fingerprint or
face recognition, but as users are also required to select a PIN or pattern in this setting, we consider the
choices above the primary choices. Moreover, an attacker attacking an authentication scheme will likely
focus on knowledge based attacks—something that can be guessed or enumerated—which make user choice of
authentication secrets still quite relevant.
Beyond the graphical password pattern, there have been a number of studies examining user choice for
PINs [11, 23, 1] and passwords [29, 28, 22, 45, 38]. Following this section, we will present the relevant work
in pattern based data collection and analysis.
Mobile Device Locking Practices There have been a number of studies of mobile device unlocking
behavior [15, 19, 40, 17, 18, 18, 40] dating back from 2013 through 2016. From these studies we know that
users perceive patterns as more secure and less error-prone (as opposed to PINs) in entry [43]; however the
opposite is often true in practice. Generally, these studies suggest that it is important to continue to study
Android’s graphical password system. Despite the fact that other methods exist, it remains a popular choice
that many users (perhaps wrongly) see as a more secure choice for protecting their device from unauthorized
access.
Background on Android Graphical Pattern The Android graphical password pattern belongs to a
family of draw-metric graphical passwords systems like Draw-A-Secret [21], Qualitative Draw-A-Secret [25],
PassPoints [47], Pass-Go [35], PassShapes [46] and PassDoodles [41] to name a few. These solutions require
the user to draw a predefined shape or an arbitrary representation.
The Android graphical password pattern presents the user with a grid of 3x3 contact points on which
the password pattern is “drawn” (see Figure 1). If the pattern is successfully recreated, entry to the device
is granted. The drawing of a pattern is constrained such that (1) a pattern must contain at least 4 contact
points, (2) a contact point may only be used once, (3) a pattern must be entered without lifting, and (4) a
user may not avoid a previously un-selected contact point. In Figure 1, an example of the allowable strokes
originating from the upper left corner are shown.
3 Limitations
It is relevant to also note the unique challenges associated with measuring and comparing data related to the
Android unlock patterns and unlock authentication methods, generally. Foremost is that, unlike text-based
passwords (and PINs), pattern authentication is not used in other contexts beyond mobile devices and is
also not used for remote authentication. This impacts data collection because, for example, much of the
common knowledge of the strength and variations in text based passwords comes from the leaks of large
password datasets from remote authentication services. Android pattern unlock, however, are primarily used
as a local authentication process, so obtaining real, user-worn graphical passwords through leaks or other
means is highly unlikely.
The limits of not having known real data to analyze challenges testing the veracity of other collection
methods because there does not exist a clear ground truth for comparison. Much of the data collected
is only self-confirming in that researchers look to find consistency between the datasets with respect to
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Term Description
Adversarial Participants are asked to generate patterns that
they believe others have used (offensive) and pat-
terns that others cannot guess (defensive)
Self-Report Participants are asked to honestly (with some
checks) report the pattern that they use (or have
used) on their mobile device
Situational The survey proposes scenarios underwhich partic-
ipants should consider generating a pattern, e.g.,
for a bank vs. just to unlock the device.
Online The survey occurred via an online form or web
application without the oversight of a researcher
App The survey occured using a specialized mobile
App, either installed on the participants device
or researchers device
Local The survey occurred within the purview of the
researcher
On-device The survey occurred using a mobile device
User-device The survey occurred using the participants own
mobile device
Pen-and-Paper The survey occurred using pen-and-paper where
participants “draw” the patterns
Mouse The survey allowed participants to use a “mouse”
rather than touch to enter patterns
Altered The survey measured altered forms of unlock pat-
terns, e.g., background images, expanded contact
points, less contact points
Table 1: Overview of Collection Method Techniques and their Descriptions
commonalities (e.g., most frequent patterns) in the user generated/reported patterns and the strength of
those patterns. Here, we attempt to cluster relevant data sets together based on features to determine if
there is broader consistency and if these consistencies can be associated with a given collection method.
We are additionally limited in that the size of the datasets analyzed are not as rich as one would want
from, say, a leaked password dataset. Again, this is due to the fact that leaks of real pattern data is not
available, and thus all the available datasets are smaller, user-study collected. Fortunately, we can use alpha-
guesswork [10], which provides comparable results even for smaller datasets, but we acknowledge that this
is a limitation on our findings.
Finally, the survey of data was completed by reviewing relevant conferences and journal in the space
of human computer interaction, computer security, and usable security. We did not use a formal system
of review, such as searching a known research database, and we acknowledge this limitations. But, with
extensive background in this space and a relatively limited number of publications in the area, we are
confident that we have broad coverage of the space.
4 A Taxonomy of Collection Methods
Here, we provide a survey and taxonomy of the relevant work regarding data collection for Android unlock
patterns, as identified by reviewing top conferences and journals in the area of computer security, usable
security, and computer human interaction. This taxonomy is organized based on the terms found in Table 1
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and is applied to the relevant research in Table 2. Studies are named based on the first letters of the authors’
surnames in which the studies are first presented, and for simplicity we only focus on the portions of study
that collect patterns directly, without modifications to the scheme such as in SysPal [13] or 4x4 patterns [4].
4.1 Protocol Scenarios
A study must incentivize participants to act in realistic ways when generating patterns, and we observed
three major forms of scenario building to incentivize participants: adversarial/game-theoretic settings, self-
reporting, and situational settings.
Adversarial Incentives One method to provide incentives to generate patterns that have a security
connection is to design an Adversarial protocol (first proposed by Uellenbeck et. al [37] and later used in a
pen-and-paper study by Aviv et. al [4] as well as by Tupsamudre et. al [36]). The core idea for this protocol
is to have participants create a set of patterns that they wish to protect, so called defensive patterns, and
a set of patterns that they believe others may have chosen, so called offensive patterns. If a participant is
able to generate a defensive pattern that others did not guess with their offensive patterns, or come up with
offensive patterns that others selected as their defensive pattern, the participant earns a reward.
This was primary method used in UDWH [37], labeled with *-off and *-def, collected on a mobile device.
Additionally, the ABK-MP-adv [4] used a similar method, but collected using pen-and-paper. For collecting
the TBLV dataset, Tupsamudre et. al [36] ran an organization-wide contest allowing each participant to
choose three defensive and three offensive patterns. The challenge with adversarial technique, as we will show,
is that it may both over incentivize participants in the defensive setting to create unrealistic, overly-strong
patterns and similar so for the offensive setting, but instead weaker patterns.
Self Reporting Another collection method is to directly ask participants to Self-Report the patterns they
use. The challenges with this approach are obvious: what is to stop participants from lying? Additionally,
it is counter to security practices for participants to release this information. These limitations are non-
negligible, but researchers can build in checks to exclude participants who abuse the survey and provide
assurances to incentivize participation. For example, the survey can have participants enter the pattern
multiple times, conduct the survey on the participants own Android device, or ask the participant directly
(without penalty) if they provided truthful answers. Additionally, as patterns are only useful with access to
the physical device, participants may feel comfortable revealing this information.
These methods were used to collect the ABK-MP-self [4] dataset which applied a self-report method by
recruiting participants from MTurk. Participants were given the option to report their pattern (on their
own device) or answer statistics (e.g., length, start point, common sequences) about their pattern. Attention
tests were used to ensure that participants answered honestly.
Situational Representations Another technique to increase the variation of patterns is to place partic-
ipants in situational scenarios with reduced or increased risk to data. The idea being that increased risk
scenarios may illicit participants to report stronger passwords as compared to the reduced risk scenarios.
These techniques have been used in text-based password research [39].
The LDR [26] data set used this technique in its protocol to increase the diversity of reported patterns.
In particular, researchers asked participants to generate a pattern for use as a bank password, as a shopping
web site password, and as normal device unlock password. One of their results shows that patterns created
for the bank are significantly stronger than those created for online shopping and device unlock. In a similar,
but less situational setting, ATOY dataset was collected with a protocol asking participants to provide one
easy to remember password and one hard to guess password [3]. SGSMA also provided a situation setting
in their dataset collection directing participants to consider setting up a new phone [32].
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Name Reference Year Collection Method Analysis Method # Participants # Patterns Protocol Description
ATOY [3] 2013 Local, Online, Mouse, Situa-
tional
Visual, Physical, Demographic 144 144 Recruited participants for a lab based study, ask-
ing them to generate one strong and one weak
pattern using a web-based survey using a mouse.
Performed visual and physical attack analysis on
collected data.
UDWH⋆ [37] 2013 Adversarial, Local, On-device Visual, Guessability, Recall 113 106 / 573 Recruited participants in university cafeteria to
interact in an adversarial protocol of offensive
and defensive patterns. Analyzed data based
on guessability, visual features, common sub se-
quences, and recall rate. (#patterns reported def-
fensive/offsenive)
SWZ [34] 2014 On-Device, Local Visual, Meter 81 27 / 54 Recruited participants at university to gener-
ate patterns with and without a password meter
(#patterns reported with-meter/without-meter)
SCOKH [33] 2015 Self-Reported, User-device, App Visual, Meter, Physical 101 49 / 52 Recruited participants by distributing an ap-
plication in the Android App Store called En-
Cloud that allowed participants to store data
in the cloud protected with a pattern. Some
participants used a password meter and other
did not. Analysis used visual features, physical
attacks, and guessability. (#patterns reported
with-meter/without-meter)
ABK-MP-self⋆ [4] 2015 Self-reported, Online, User-
device
Visual, Guessability, Demo-
graphics
757 443 Recruitment via MTurk to either report their pat-
tern or statistics about the pattern. Attention
tests were used to checks for honesty, and par-
ticipants must use Android Devices to complete
survey.
ABK-MP-adv⋆ [4] 2015 Adversarial, Local, Pen-and-
paper
Visual, Guessability, Recall, De-
mographics
38 114 / 380 Recruitment at university and group participants
into small focus groups of size (8-to-20) to con-
duct adversarial protocol. (#patterns reported
defensive/offensive)
SGSMA [32] 2015 Online, User-device, Situational Visual, Guessability 92 92 Recruited via MTurk and asked participants to
imagine receive new phone and generate a pattern
for that phone (with some participants received
nudges to select strong patterns, see SGSMA-
BLINK and SGSMA-EPSM)
LDR⋆ [26] 2016 Online, User-device, Situational Visual, Guessability, Demo-
graphics
802 841 / 842 / 838 Recruited using snowball methods and asked par-
ticipants to generate patterns under three appli-
cation scenarios (#patterns report for scenarios
banking/shopping/unlock)
ZEBOdLAH⋆ [44] 2016 Online, User-device Visual 506 506 Recruitment via MTurk to generate patterns on
participants own device (with some participants
using background images or other nudges, see
ZEBSOdLAH-bg)
CHCOSK [13] 2017 Online, User-Device Recall, Guessability, Visual 384 384 Recruitment via MTurk for individuals who
owned an Android device.
TBLV [36] 2017 Online, Adversarial (variant),
Mouse
Visual, Guessability 11,960 34,548/35,249 Recruitment within organization, asking them for
3 distinct patterns that are easy for them to re-
member but difficult for others to guess, and 3
distinct patterns which they think are being used
by other participants. Participants were able to
choose between the standard 3 × 3 arrangement
and a circular arrangement (see TBLV-passO)
Table 2: Overview of publications with collected datasets for the classical Android Unlock Pattern. The ⋆ indicates datasets available to use
for comparative analysis in Section 5.
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Name Reference Year Collection
Method
Analysis
Method
# Participants # Patterns Protocol Description
UDWH-los [37] 2013 Adversarial,
Local, On-
device,
Altered
Guessability,
Recall
105 92 / 460 Recruitment/protocol the same as UDWH but
with altered contact point layout dubbed “Left-
out small” with one point removed. (#patterns
reported defensive/offensive)
UDWH-lol [37] 2013 Adversarial,
Local, On-
device,
Altered
Guessability,
Recall
99 87 / 439 Recruitment/protocol the same as UDWH but
with altered contact point layout dubbed “Left-
out large” with one point removed. (#patterns
reported defensive/offensive)
UDWH-circ [37] 2013 Adversarial,
Local, On-
device,
Altered
Guessability,
Recall
82♮ 86 / 429 Recruitment/protocol the same as UDWH but
with altered contact point layout in a “circu-
lar” arrangement. (#patterns reported defen-
sive/offensive)
UDWH-rand [37] 2013 Adversarial,
Local, On-
device,
Altered
Guessability,
Recall
80 80 / 399 Recruitment/protocol the same as UDWH but
with altered contact point layout in a “random
placement” arrangement. (#patterns reported
defensive/offensive)
ABK-MP-adv-4x4 [4] 2015 Adversarial,
Local, Pen-
and-paper,
Altered
Visual,
Guessabil-
ity, Recall
40 119 / 382 Protocol same as ABK-MP-adv except the grid-
szize was expanded to 4x4. (#patterns reported
defensive/offensive)
SGSMA-EPSM [32] 2015 Online,
User-
Device,
Situational,
Altered
Visual
Guessabil-
ity
72 72 Protocol same as SGSMA except pattern entry
was altered to include continuous meter feedback
based on [2].
SGSMA-BLINK [32] 2015 Online,
User-
Device,
Situational,
Altered
Visual
Guessabil-
ity
106 105 Protocol same as SGSMA pattern entry was al-
tered to include blinking contact points to suggest
starting points.
ZEBOdLAH-bg [44] 2016 Online,
User-device,
Mouse,
Altered
Visual 496 496 / 496 Recruitment via email lists and divided partici-
pants into two alterations one with static back-
ground image (girl’s face) and one with dynamic
background image (moving air bubbles (#pat-
terns reported for static/dynamic)
CHCOSK-syspal [13] 2017 Online,
User-Device
Recall,
Guessabil-
ity, Visual
331/342/326/334 331/342/326/334 Same as CHCOSK except that 1-point/2-point/3-
point/Random-points were pre-selected that the
participant must select patterns using those con-
tact points
TBLV-passO [36] 2017 Online,
Adversarial
(variant),
Mouse,
Altered
Visual,
Guessabil-
ity
9,093 26,469/26,914 Protocol same as TBLV. Participants were able to
choose between the standard 3 × 3 arrangement
and a circular arrangement.
Table 3: Overview of collected datasets for variants of the classical patterns (♮ there apears to be a small inconsistency in the number of reported
participants for this study)
7
4.2 Participant Recruitment
Local vs. On-line Collecting Android unlock patterns can be conducted in two main ways, locally or
remotely. A local study occurs when the researchers and participants are co-located, for example, in the
form of a lab study where participant are asked to come into a setting and generate patterns under the
supervision of the researcher(s). The benefits of such an approach relate to the experimenter’s ability to
control extraneous and independent variables. However, logistics of bringing in a large sample of participants
within a short time period is not without its challenges. Additionally, the presence of a research can lead
to Hawethorn effect whereby participants behave differently due to being directly observed or having an
expectation of a given outcome.
In contrast, a remote study is conducted without the direct supervision of the researcher, and is generally
conducted on-line via a web-based platform accessed through the browser. They can be distributed using
services like Amazon Mechanical Turk, the marketplace, or using a snowball technique. Users may feel more
comfortable interacting with technologies within their own environment during remote studies, although the
risk of interruptions in an uncontrolled environment is higher than in an in-lab study. A challenge with
the on-line setting is verifying that participants act in ways that are conducive to the study, which can be
directly observed in the local setting.
Good examples of local studies in our survey are the data sets ATOY, UDWH, SGSMA, SWZ, and
ABK-MP-adv [37, 3, 34, 4, 32]. In each of these studies the researchers were present during data collection;
in ATOY, this took the form of a lab computer where participants were asked to enter patterns that were
easy and hard; in UDWH, this took the form of research recruiting participants in the institutions cafeteria
and instructing them in the procedures of the protocol; and in ABK-MP-adv participants were divided into
study groups and operated under the supervision of the researchers to complete the protocol.
Good examples of online studies are ABK-MP-self, LDR, ZEBOdLAH, CHKCOSK, and TBLV [4, 26, 44,
13, 36]. In each of these studies, the participants were recruited either via a system like Amazon Mechanical
Turk [4, 44, 13], snowball efforts [26], or company mailing lists [36] to complete a survey hosted on-line. The
researcher and the participant are separated from each other, as opposed to a local study.
Application Based A separate, but related form of on-line surveys recruitment, is by distributing a
specialized application (i.e., an App) developed using Android’s development tools and posting the App via
one of the Android Application marketplaces. We describe this technique as App in Table 1 and can be an
effective way to get known, real Android users to participate in the study. The challenges with this technique
comes down to ethics; users may interpret the application as non-research and use the application in ways
that are unintended by the researchers. However, proper informed consent can account for this.
A good example of this methodology is the SCOKH study [33]. The researchers released an application
into the market place called EnCloud which purported to be a encrypted cloud storage service where data
was secured using an Android unlock pattern. The participants were then allowed to choose patterns under
different conditions, e.g., having a meter or not, to measure the effectiveness of their choices.
4.3 User Input Methods
There are also varied forms for the ways in which participants generate a pattern for study. For example,
as the Android unlock pattern is used on a touchscreen device, it is most natural to conduct the survey
where users enter patterns via touch gestures on a smartphone or tablet. This natural setting is described as
On-device, and if it occurred on participants’ own devices, we describe this as User-device. Both App based
studies and on-line studies can utilize on-device/user-device methods as well as local collections.
A good example of the distinction between on-device (but not user-device) is the UDWH data set where
participants were recruited at a school cafeteria and were directed to use a device with the survey pre-
built in [37]. ABK-MP-self, LDR, ZEBOdLAH, SGSMA and SCOKH, in contrast, were conducted on-line
and allowed participants to use their own device to complete the survey [32, 4, 26, 33, 44] often requiring
participants to use an Android device (checked via the user-agent field) or because the survey was distributed
through the App marketplace.
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Term Description
Visual Patterns were analyzed based on visual or
structural properties, such as the length,
crosses, or other aspects that affect its
visual construction
Meter Patterns were anlayzed based on a
password-like meter construction devel-
oped by the authors
Physical Patterns were analyzed in the context
of physical attacks, such as smudge at-
tacks [7] or shoulder surfing [30, 42, 14, 5]
Occurrence Rates Patterns were analyzed for how fre-
quently they appear in the data, or how
frequently subests of patterns (e.g., 3-
grams) appear
Guessability Patterns were analyzed based on how
guessable they are to an adversary trying
to crack the password, typically reported
in terms of the guessing entropy [22, 10]
Recall Patterns were measured based on mem-
orability and recall rates of the partici-
pants
Demographic Pattern properties were measured (e.g.,
using one of the above methods) and
compared along demographic factors
(e.g., handedness, male/female, loca-
tion).
Table 4: Overview of Analysis Method Techniques and their Descriptions
For some online studies, though, it could be the case that some participants used a Mouse to enter
patterns (as in ATOY), which may affect the kinds of patterns that are deemed “usable” as the mouse allows
for finer motor control as compared to gestures [3].
Additionally, as the Android unlock patterns are “drawn” it is also possible to conduct studies using pen-
and-paper where participants literally draw patterns using a pen on a sheet of paper with printed contact
points, as was the case in ABK-MP-adv. Such a non-technical data collection method may seem counter
intuitive for this space, but the sensory aspect of drawing translates well between touching and writing.
There is also evidence that this technique does produce realistic results [8], but some spatial aspects of
patterns (e.g., the starting points) may be slightly changed as compared to other collection methods.
5 Analysis and Comparison of Datasets
Next, we turn our attention to the actual collected data, performing analysis over that data using the most
common techniques. A list of analysis methods used in the prior work are provided in Table 4; we focus on
occurrence rates, visual features, and guessability. We do not consider ad-hoc methods of pattern strength,
as used in password meters [33, 34] as these are not grounded and are typically based on visual features
anyway. We also do not consider recall rates as they are not germane to comparing datasets.
Unfortunately, we were not able to acquire all relevant datasets, either due to ethical reasons or institu-
tional oversight, but we were able to access 9 distinct datasets presented in four prior publications: ABK-MP-
self, ABK-MP-adv-def, ABK-MP-adv-off [4]; LDR-banking, LDR-shopping, LDR-unlock [26]; UDWH-def,
UDWH-off [37]; and ZEBOdLAH [44].
Occurrence Rates The most basic analysis one can perform to compare datasets is to look at the most
commonly used patterns. One can visualize the most frequent patterns (such a visual is provided in Figure 2),
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ABK-MP-adv-off
freq=9 freq=9 freq=9 freq=7 freq=6 freq=5 freq=5 freq=5 freq=5 freq=5
ABK-MP-self
freq=17 freq=11 freq=8 freq=8 freq=7 freq=6 freq=6 freq=6 freq=5 freq=4
LDR-banking
freq=17 freq=16 freq=15 freq=9 freq=8 freq=8 freq=6 freq=6 freq=6 freq=6
LDR-shopping
freq=26 freq=24 freq=21 freq=19 freq=18 freq=15 freq=14 freq=10 freq=9 freq=9
LDR-unlock
freq=27 freq=23 freq=22 freq=16 freq=15 freq=12 freq=8 freq=8 freq=8 freq=8
UDWH-offensive
freq=25 freq=22 freq=11 freq=9 freq=9 freq=8 freq=7 freq=6 freq=6 freq=6
ZEBOdLAH
freq=12 freq=11 freq=10 freq=7 freq=7 freq=6 freq=6 freq=6 freq=5 freq=5
Total
freq=95 freq=91 freq=90 freq=86 freq=70 freq=41 freq=40 freq=40 freq=39 freq=37
Figure 2: Top 10 most frequent patterns in each of the datasets, excluding defensive patterns due to low
frequency numbers for each of the patterns.
and a casual observations provides some intuition that there exists a number of high occurring patterns that
are consistent across datasets, such as a the Z or L shape (in various symmetries).
We avoid analysis of the frequency of individual patterns, which has been covered in prior work related
to these datasets, and instead concern ourselves with comparing the datasets with respect to how frequent
repeated patterns occur as well as the overall uniqueness of the data. Both of these metrics are related to the
strength of the dataset; the less unique (or more repetitions) a dataset is (or has) the easier it is to predict
the patterns and thus guess the patterns.
Repetitions are calculated by counting the number of patterns that occur two ore more times in the
dataset, which we can then normalize by the size of the dataset because larger datasets should have pro-
portionally larger number of repetitions. The uniqueness of the dataset measures the proportion of unique
patterns to the total number of data in the dataset. For example, a 50% unique dataset implies that of the
100 patterns in the dataset, 50 of them are unique and the other 50 are repeats. These results are presented
in Table 5.
Using a χ2 test, we can test for significant differences in the proportions of both repetitions and unique-
ness, and in both cases, we find that there are significant differences (χ2 = 20.31, p < 0.01 for repetitions, and
χ2 = 213.03, p = 0.0 for uniqueness). Further investigation into the differences using a post-hoc, pairwise
test using a false discover rate correction, showed that there are distinct groupings of similar datasets in each
category. The groupings are represented in Table 5 using letters, such that datasets with the same letter are
not significantly different.
For the proportion of repetitions, the defensive datasets stand out, but particularly the UDWH-def
dataset which has significantly fewer repetitions than the other datasets and is only similar to the other
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dataset size rep. norm. rep. %unique avg std
UDWH-def 106 3 0.028 a 97.2% a 0.029 0.168
ABK-MP-adv-def 113 8 0.071 ab 92.9% a 0.076 0.265
UDWH-off 573 78 0.136 b 59.2% b 0.690 2.196
ABK-MP-self 440 61 0.139 b 67.7% c 0.477 1.484
LDR-shopping 841 119 0.141 b 52.6% d 0.903 2.694
ZEBOdLAH 507 72 0.142 b 69.0% c 0.449 1.297
ABK-MP-adv-off 378 57 0.151 b 65.6% bc 0.524 1.292
LDR-banking 838 128 0.153 b 66.2% c 0.510 1.482
LDR-unlock 842 138 0.164 b 49.8% d 1.010 2.604
Table 5: The size and number of repeated (rep.) patterns in each of the dataset, sorted by the normalized
repetitions (norm. rep.). Using a χ2 test, there is significant differences in the proportions of repetitions
(χ2 = 20.31, p < 0.01) and uniqueness (χ2 = 213.03, p = 0.0). Pairwise posthoc analysis with a false
discovery rate (fdr) correction was used to determined letter based grouping whereby datasets with the
same letter are not significantly different. Also provided is the average number of repetitions (avg) and the
standard deviation (std).
Spatial Features Visual Properties
Length=7 Cross KMove Non-adj
Stroke-Length=6.82
Turns=2
Figure 3: Pictorial of the spatial and visual features: length is the number of contact points, stroke length
(slength) is the length of the line segments with (0,0) mapped to the center point, turns is the number of
direction changes, cross is any cross over, kmove is a connection of two contact points over 2 and across 1
(like a knight moves in chess), and non-adj is when a previously contacted point is traced over to connect
two non-adjacent points.
defensive dataset. This suggests that the adversarial collection method tends to encourage participants to
select more unique patterns for the defensive collection, and as these were both collected in-person, the effect
of having other participants and researchers present may further encourage this behavior.
When measuring dataset uniqueness, the post-hoc analysis reveals other relationships, breaking down into
three basic regimes. The highest proportion of unique patterns is, again, the defensive datasets (a grouping).
There is also a low regime with the lowest proportion of unique patterns which contains the LDR-shopping
and LDR-unlock (d grouping). In the middle, bottom-half, are the two offensive datasets ABK-MP-adv-off,
UDWH-off (overlapping in b) and the top-half contains the remaining datasets of ABK-MP-self, ZEBOdLAH,
and LDR-banking (overlapping at c groupings).
This suggests that the adversarial model produces similar results in both the higher regime defensive
and middle regime offensive. The scenario driven data collection with the weakest motivator, shopping and,
surprisingly, unlocking, have some of the least unique sets of patterns. Finally, the remaining datasets, which
contain collection with stronger scenarios and self-reporting, on device, have a close consistent groupings. We
will see similar groupings when analyzing the strengths of the datasets as uniqueness properties are related
to guessability strength metrics.
Spatial Features and Visual Properties We analyzed the provided datasets using three spatial features
and three visual properties. Each of these pattern classification methods have been applied in prior work as
a way to understand the shapes of patterns [13, 26, 32, 4, 8, 3, 37], or as way to estimate the strength of a
pattern, as in a password meter [33, 34]. For a pictorial, refer to Figure 3, as each is explained.
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Figure 4: Histogram of lengths in each of the data
sets
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Figure 5: Histogram of stroke lengths in each of the
data sets
• Spatial Features:
– Length (length): The number of contact points used in the pattern. For example, the Z-shaped
pattern used 7 contact points.
– Stroke Length (s-length): The length of the gesture lines in the pattern by using the Gaussian
distance measure with the center contact point mapped to (0,0) and each contact point being one
unit apart. For example, the Z-shaped pattern has a stroke length 6.82, with the top and bottom
line worth 2 units, and the diagonal is 2 · √2.
– Turns (turns): The number of direction changes in a pattern. For example, the Z-shaped pattern
makes two direction changes, thus has 2 turns.
• Visual Properties:
– Crosses (crosses): When two lines overlap and cross over in any shape.
– Knight Moves (kmoves): When a line connects two contact points over 1 and down 2 (or in
symmetries), like a knight moves in chess.
– Non Adjacency (non-adj): When a previous contacted point is traced over to connect two non-
adjacent contact points. In the example in Figure 3, the middle contact point is first, then right,
then over the middle to the left, connecting two non-adjacent contact points.
The results of calculating these features and properties across the datasets are presented in Table 6.
Significance testing was done using Kruskal-Wallis as there was unequal variance or non-normal distributions
in the data. As this is a conservative test, and the datasets are relatively large, we found that there was
significant differences among the dataset for each of the tested features. Using pairwise Mann-Whitney
U-tests with a Bonferroni correction, we sought to identify groups of similar datasets, these are labeled with
letter codes in Table 6. As before, datasets, under the category, with the same letter are not significantly
different.
For length and slength, there is a clear grouping which suggests that collection methods may have had
an effect on pattern length features. In particular, both adversarial method’s datasets are much longer than
the scenario-driven ones, with the self-reporting in the middle. As length is correlated with slength and
turns, similar groupings exist there. For visual properties, e.g., crosses, kmoves, non-adj, we see that these
groupings by collection do not persists, and there are is much overlap across different datasets.
These results suggest that the collection method can impact some of the features, namely those based
on the length of the pattern, but the effect is small (ǫ2 < 0.08). Adversarial (e.g, *-off,*-def) collection
methods encourage slightly longer patterns, while scenario-driven (ZEBOdLAH, LDR-*) collection tends
towards slightly shorter. While other visual features vary across datasets, the overlapping similarities do not
appear to correlate across collection methods and there is very small, perhaps trivial, effects.
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dataset length slength turns crosses kmoves non-adj
UDWH-off 6.30 (1.68) a 5.88 (1.97) a 2.64 (1.35) a 0.08 (0.39) bc 0.06 (0.30) a 0.09 (0.32) bc
UDWH-def 6.55 (1.74) a 6.45 (2.08) a 3.31 (1.40) b 0.21 (0.58) a 0.15 (0.43) b 0.16 (0.42) ac
ABK-MP-adv-off 6.34 (1.67) a 5.90 (1.75) a 2.62 (1.15) a 0.02 (0.18) c 0.03 (0.23) a 0.11 (0.32) abc
ABK-MP-adv-def 6.11 (1.53) ab 5.99 (1.89) ab 2.94 (1.30) ab 0.13 (0.59) ab 0.09 (0.43) ab 0.14 (0.42) abc
ABK-MP-self 6.05 (1.63) ab 5.82 (2.08) ab 2.65 (1.30) a 0.14 (0.75) ab 0.08 (0.44) ab 0.16 (0.43) a
LDR-banking 5.92 (1.83) b 5.67 (2.44) b 2.78 (1.58) a 0.21 (1.08) a 0.14 (0.66) b 0.12 (0.43) abc
LDR-shopping 5.54 (1.70) c 5.05 (2.02) c 2.28 (1.31) c 0.08 (0.53) bc 0.08 (0.41) ab 0.07 (0.33) b
LDR-unlock 5.40 (1.57) c 4.92 (1.93) cd 2.20 (1.23) c 0.07 (0.48) bc 0.06 (0.36) a 0.07 (0.30) b
ZEBOdLAH 5.03 (1.44) d 4.66 (1.77) d 2.22 (1.09) c 0.08 (0.30) ab 0.07 (0.32) ab 0.08 (0.28) bc
χ
2 = 347.88, p = 0.00 χ2 = 320.02, p = 0.00 χ2 = 189.40, p = 0.00 χ2 = 69.11, p = 0.00 χ2 = 39.67, p = 0.00 χ2 = 50.91, p = 0.00
ǫ
2 = 0.075 ǫ2 = 0.069 ǫ2 = 0.041 ǫ2 = 0.015 ǫ2 = 0.009 ǫ2 = 0.011
Table 6: Spatial features, displaying mean and std, inset. Significance testing conducted using Kruskal-Wallis
rank sum test with post-hoc grouping using pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests with a Bonferroni correction.
Datasets with the same letter are not significantly different from each over. Effect size is calculated using
the ǫ2 method, small effects are in the range [0.01, 0.08).
dataset start-x start-y end-x end-y
ABK-MP-adv-def -0.34 (0.76) ab 0.41 (0.81) ab 0.15 (0.79) a -0.20 (0.84) ab
ABK-MP-adv-off -0.32 (0.80) a 0.34 (0.83) a 0.19 (0.86) a -0.12 (0.87) a
ABK-MP-self -0.49 (0.77) b 0.39 (0.86) ab 0.34 (0.79) a -0.19 (0.84) ab
LDR-banking -0.42 (0.82) ab 0.40 (0.84) ab 0.25 (0.81) a -0.22 (0.81) ab
LDR-shopping -0.42 (0.81) ab 0.51 (0.79) b 0.28 (0.80) a -0.26 (0.82) ab
LDR-unlock -0.43 (0.80) ab 0.43 (0.83) ab 0.34 (0.79) a -0.32 (0.79) b
UDWH-def -0.45 (0.83) ab 0.28 (0.90) ab 0.13 (0.81) a -0.21 (0.79) ab
UDWH-off -0.50 (0.79) b 0.42 (0.85) ab 0.21 (0.85) a -0.26 (0.85) ab
ZEBOdLAH -0.50 (0.73) b 0.37 (0.81) a 0.26 (0.80) a -0.18 (0.79) a
χ2 = 23.7 χ2 = 23.9 χ2 = 23.4 χ2 = 22.5
p = 0.00 p = 0.00 p = 0.00 p = 0.00
ǫ
2
< 0.01 ǫ2 < 0.01 ǫ2 < 0.01 ǫ2 < 0.01
Table 7: Start and end points when mapping (0,0) to the center point and using Gaussian distance (standard
deviation inset): Used ANOVA to test significance difference and a post-hoc pairwise t-test with Bonferonni
correction. The ∗ indicates significant result from post-hoc analysis. Effect size is calculated using the ǫ2
method, small effects are in the range [0.01, 0.08), below which are considered trivial.
Start- and End-conditions A similar analysis is used to understand the start and end conditions of
patterns, that is, which contact points in the grid do users tend to select for initiating and terminating a
pattern. We compute averages by assigning the middle point of the pattern to the (0,0) in the Cartesian
plain, as before, and calculating the average x and y shift for the start and end locations when mapped into
the plain. The analysis is found in Table 7.
Using Kruskal-Wallis, we find that there does exist significant differences between the data sets, but
these differences are small, and in post-hoc analysis using pairwise Mann-Whitney U-test with Bonferroni
corrections, there are large groupings of similarities between the datasets that appear uncorrelated with
dataset or collection method. Additionally, the effect size of ǫ2 < 0.01 is trivial, all suggesting that collection
methods likely plays little role in spatial shifting of the start and end points. Users seems consistent in
preferring to start in the upper-left and end in the lower-right.
Strength of individual patterns Pattern strength is inversely related to the frequency and probability
of a pattern being used in real life, as a rational attacker will try to guess more frequent/likely patterns first
to maximize his success for a limited number of attempts. While the frequency of patterns is known within
the sample sets, it is imperative to estimate the likelihood of patterns, generally.
Different approaches have been used to do this estimation. We use Markov models to calculate the
probabilities of users selecting a given pattern which can then be used as an approximations for the pattern
strength. The technique we apply follows closely that of Aviv et al. [4], which expands on the Markov model
of Uellenbeck et al. [37] by adding in additional predictions related to the start points, length, and finish
points of the pattern.
Markov models are based on the observation that subsequent tokens, such as letters in normal text or
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min 1st quart. median 3rd quart. max
UDWH-def 0.52 5.68 8.83 13.13 19.93
ABK-MP-adv-def 0.52 4.87 7.64 11.76 19.93
ABK-MP-adv-off 0.52 3.86 6.46 9.13 19.93
ABK-MP-self 0.52 3.91 6.00 9.59 19.93
ZEBOdLAH 0.52 4.29 6.38 9.43 19.93
LDR-banking 0.52 4.21 6.48 9.39 19.93
UDWH-off 0.52 3.60 5.50 9.04 19.93
LDR-shopping 0.52 3.65 5.27 8.42 19.93
LDR-unlock 0.52 3.76 5.27 7.94 19.93
Table 8: Basic statistical information about pattern strength per data set. Data sets are grouped based
on similarity of collection protocols and results. The data is divided into a high, medium, and low strength
regime based on the median pattern strength.
contact points in the pattern, are rarely independently chosen by humans, but can often be quite accurately
modeled based on a short history of tokens. For example, in English texts, the letter following a t is more
likely to be an h than a q, and for Android pattern unlock, a similar process occurs by which users are more
likely to choose some transitions over others based on prior state, e.g., starting in the upper left, a user will
more likely move to the right as opposed to the center contact point.
Using these facts, one can construct an n-gram Markov model that estimates the likelihood of a pattern
by considering the probability of a transition from the previous n − 1 contact points to the next contact
point. For a given sequence of contact points for a pattern p = {c1, . . . , cm}, an n-gram Markov model
estimates its probability as
P (c1, . . . , cm) (1)
= P (c1, . . . , cn−1) ·
m∏
i=n
P (ci|ci−n+1, . . . , ci−1).
The required initial probabilities P (c1, . . . , cn−1) and transition probabilities P (cn|c1, . . . , cn−1) can be
determined empirically from the relative frequencies from training data. To handle the varying length of
patterns we additionally multiply with a length term P (|p| = m). Also, as suggested by Aviv et al [4], we
consider special (non-contact) start transitions and end transitions to capture start and end conditions for
transitions less than length n as they occur at the beginning and end of a pattern.
One commonly applies further post-processing to the raw frequencies: So-called smoothing tries to even
out statistical effects in the transition matrix and initial probabilities. In particular, smoothing avoids relative
frequencies of 0, as these would yield an overall probability of 0 regardless of the remaining probabilities. We
use smoothing based on a uniform probability drawn from the set of all 389,112 possible patterns, assuming
each are equally likely.
In our analysis, to determine the strength of an individual pattern, we trained a 3-gram Markov model
using all patterns in our collected dataset with one instance of the pattern being measured left out. This
process ensures independence of training and evaluation sets while preserving information about pattern
frequencies. For example, the pattern may be very frequent, but only a single instance is removed. The
estimated probabilities for patterns, pˆ, could be used directly as a strength measurement, but as probabilities
over a large set of possibilities, they are quite small. A more readable measure is− log(pˆ+ǫ), where logarithms
are to basis 2, and we add a small constant ǫ = 10−6 to cap strength scores at 19.9315 ≈ 20. We use this
strength measure in the rest of this work as a representation of a likelihood of pattern as estimated by the
Markov model.
We compare the strength scores for the individual datasets and present the results in Table 9. A Shapiro-
Wilk test suggest that the data is not normally distributed (W = 0.90, p < 2.2e − 16), and so we compare
the data using a Kruskal-Wallis to find that that there are significant differences across the datasets (χ2 =
122.23, p = 0.00) The results from the post-hoc test (pairwise Mann-Whitney U with Holm correction)
are shown in Table 10. The table shows the corrected p-values from the pairwise comparison, and marks
significant differences in bold.
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α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.5 20-guesses
UDWH-def 10.02 11.51 13.28 4.76%
ABK-MP-adv-def 8.91 9.73 12.65 5.91%
ABK-MP-adv-off 6.85 7.70 9.40 13.47%
ABK-MP-self 6.00 7.23 9.31 14.62%
ZEBOdLAH 6.37 6.87 8.92 18.00%
LDR-banking 6.87 7.84 9.81 13.38%
UDWH-off 5.54 6.85 8.95 19.00%
LDR-shopping 5.50 6.74 8.35 18.88%
LDR-unlock 4.90 6.43 8.06 21.12%
Table 9: Partial guessing entropy for α = {0.1, 0.2, 0.5} of each of the data sets calculated using an average
of 5-runs of 5-fold cross-validation, with the percentage of patterns guessed after the first 20 attempts.
UDWH-def ABK-MP-adv-def ABK-MP-adv-off ABK-MP-self ZEBOdLAH LDR-banking UDWH-off LDR-shopping LDR-unlock
UDWH-def - 0.55084 3.1e-06 1.3e-05 0.00011 3.6e-06 3.1e-08 5.0e-11 4.0e-12
ABK-MP-adv-def 0.55084 - 0.01777 0.04427 0.22124 0.06071 0.00063 4.5e-06 1.2e-06
ABK-MP-adv-off 3.1e-06 0.01777 - 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.05711 0.01500
ABK-MP-self 1.3e-05 0.04427 1.00000 - 1.00000 1.00000 0.57343 0.01500 0.00363
ZEBOdLAH 0.00011 0.22124 1.00000 1.00000 - 1.00000 0.01500 7.9e-06 8.0e-07
LDR-banking 3.6e-06 0.06071 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 - 0.02543 2.8e-06 1.2e-07
UDWH-off 3.1e-08 0.00063 1.00000 0.57343 0.01500 0.02543 - 1.00000 0.87558
LDR-shopping 5.0e-11 4.5e-06 0.05711 0.01500 7.9e-06 2.8e-06 1.00000 - 1.00000
LDR-unlock 4.0e-12 1.2e-06 0.01500 0.00363 8.0e-07 1.2e-07 0.87558 1.00000 -
Table 10: Results from post-hoc test (pairwise Mann-Whitney U test with Holm correction) on strength.
Given are the (corrected) p-values, where significant differences are marked bold. Grouping is loosely based
on the differences in strength.
These results directly inform the grouping of our datasets based on similarity of pattern strength, and
are similar to the groupings found in the dataset uniqueness analysis as the Markov model probabilities are
sensitive to that metric. This grouping into a low, medium, and high strenght regime informs our analysis
going forward.
(Partial) Guessing Entropy based on Markov Model (Partial) guessing entropy [27, 10] is a measure
of the strength of human-chosen authentication secrets, such as pattern sequences, with a strong theoretical
foundation. Intuitively, it models an “ideal” attacker who knows the probabilities of all patterns, and guesses
those patterns in order of decreasing likelihood. This has the advantage that it does not depend on a specific
guessing algorithm, but has the disadvantage that it assumes an ideal (and possibly unrealistic) adversary.
We use the logarithmic variant of this measure, G˜α(X), which gives “bits of information” (see [10] for
definitions and details).
Computing G˜α requires an accurate approximation of the distribution X , which normally requires large
sample sizes beyond the collected data. In line with previous work [37] we use an approximation based
on Markov models to compute G˜α. Thus the entropy results are relative to the chosen Markov model,
and typically constitute an upper bound only. We report (partial) entropy estimates for the levels α ∈
{0.1, 0.2, 0.5}, i.e., for an attacker trying to break 10%, 20%, or 50% of the accounts, respectively.
To do the guessing, we performed a 5-fold cross-validation on each dataset by which we trained the
Markov model using 4 of the folds and guessed on the remaining fold. We guessed based on the absolute
ordering of all 389,112 patterns based on the likelihood measures as computed by the Markov model. More
advanced and aggressive guessing strategies could be used (as described by Aviv et. al [4]), but this strategy
produces the most repeatable results.
The results are presented in Table 9 which are an average of 3 runs of the cross-fold validation. The
results show similar groupings as in Table 10. We also note that these entropy measures are not precisely
as reported in prior work [4, 37] and is likely due to small variations (or over-fitting) in modeling for the
Markov model; however, general trends remain.
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6 Discussion of Collection Methods
Adversarial Setting Two datasets are collected under the adversarial settings: The UDHW and the
ABK-MP-adv datasets. Tables 8 and 9 shows that the two defensive datasets are the strongest datasets
available to us, and in fact the post-hoc tests show that the two defensive sets are significantly stronger than
almost every other dataset (the only two exceptions are ABK-MP-adv-def/ZEBOdLAH and ABK-MP-adv-
def/LDR-banking).
It seems most likely that these differences can be explained by the collection method. This is evident
due to the fact that the corresponding offensive data is collected during the same experiment from the same
user base and shows significant differences in strength — namely, they are some of the weakest in terms of
strength — but while significant differences exist in spatial features, there are reactively small magnitude
differences. We also see similarity between the offensive and defensive (respectively) for repetitions and
uniqueness qualities. This all suggests that the adversarial setting encourages participants to draw the same
patterns based on visual indicators, but somehow are incentivized to choose less common, harder to guess
patterns. Second, all the other datasets behave much more similar (in terms of strength and guessability)
compared to the defensive sets. For example, the ABK-MP-adv-def and UDWH-def are 3 and 4 bits higher
in partial guessing entropy compared to the next highest data set.
Situational Settings On the weak end of the spectrum, three datasets are generally weaker than the other
datasets, the LDR-shopping and LDR-unlock datasets, as well as the UDWH-off. The three LDR datasets
were collected using the same situational protocol, but it was observed in the original publication [26] that
the three datasets behave differently and that the banking scenario prompted participants to choose stronger
patterns. The three datasets are significantly weaker than any other dataset, with three exceptions (UDWH-
off/ABK-MP-adv-off, UDWH-off/ABK-MP-self, and LDR-shopping/ABK-MP-adv-off). From these results,
we speculate and would recommend that researchers use strong situational motivation.
Medium strength datasets The four remaining datasets, i.e., ABK-MP-adv-off, ABK-MP-self, ZEBOd-
LAH, and LDR-banking, have no significant differences in strength amongst each other. They form a more
or less consistent subset with very similar strength and guessability characteristics. We conjecture that this
group of datasets may most likely mimic reality of pattern strength as they include the only self-reported
dataset (ABK-self) and there is such strong similarity.
Participant recruitment Both UDWH and ABK-MP-adv performed local recruitment, while most other
datasets in our evaluation performed online recruitment. In principle, this could provide an alternate expla-
nation for the strength of the defensive datasets, e.g., some form of a Hawthorn effect whereby the presence
of the researcher (or other participants) affected the results. However, the differences in collection protocol,
specifically the strong external incentives from other participants attacking the pattern, seem a much more
likely explanation for the observed strength differences.
There is some argument to be made that application-based data collection may provide the most reliable
data from a population using their phone with an installed application with real-world accounts. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have access to a dataset collected under this protocol.
Input methods Almost all datasets available to us were collected on a mobile device (either user device
or provided device), but it doesn’t seem likely that this difference influences the strength of patterns. (The
only exception is the ABK-MP-adv dataset which was collected using pen-and-paper.) In most cases it
seems advisable to have an input method as close to the original input as possible, and thus perform a study
on a provided or the user’s own device. Sometimes, e.g., to address privacy concerns, data collection using
pen-and-paper can be preferable. This is consistent with the results previously reported by Aviv et. al [6]
that there were minimal differences in the pen-and-paper sample. As such, we woudl recommend that studies
be conducted on-device when possible, but pen-and-paper can be used as substitute in an adversarial setting
with only considering the offensive data set.
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7 Conclusion
We present the first cross dataset comparison of Android unlock patterns, as well as a systemized review of
the collection and analysis methods used in this space. From this work, we find that there exist significant
differences, both in terms of pattern strength (as measured using guessability metrics) and visual/spatial
properties. However, the impact of spatial properties is relatively small, albiet significant, but collection
method has a large effect on pattern strength. Adversarial settings both over and under incentivize strong
and weak patterns, and weak situational motivators can also have a negative effect. We find that there is a
strong, consistent midrange of data that we conjecture that most likely contains the most realistic patterns.
Additionally, the input method and participant recruitment settings seem to have limitted or no effect.
Based on this survey and analysis, we would recommend that researchers carefully consider the collection
method to ensure that there are clear motivators. For example, use a variety of data collection methods to
assess a range of possible values when performing strength. Additionally, researchers should use grounded
strength metrics, based on guessability, as there is not enough differences in spatial and visual features to
make strong claims.
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